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ABSTRACT
THE EMPLOYER PREFERENCE FOR THE SUBSERVIENT WORKER AND THE MAKING OF THE
BROWN COLLAR WORKPLACE

The rapidly growing Latino immigrant population raises questions about how the “brown
collar” worker is being incorporated into our economy. Newly arrived Latino immigrants, or
“brown collar” workers, are increasingly found in segregated workplaces throughout the country.
They typically perform the least desirable jobs in the most unstable conditions in our economy.
This article explores the creation of these workplaces by focusing first, on the conditions that
create brown collar subservience and second, on employer practices that seek workers out for their
subservience. Today’s anti-discrimination law does not adequately capture the form of
discrimination lurking in the interaction between brown collar workers taking the jobs no one else
wants and employers seeking subservient workers.
The myth of the immigrant worker taking the jobs nobody else wants resonates in our
public culture. This article challenges the myth by exploring sociological theories that explain how
and why employers, through their preference for subservient workers, create jobs that native-born
workers will not take. It also uncovers assumptions about the dynamics of immigrant workplaces
embedded in neoclassical economic theories at the heart of judicial opinions. Practices such as
network hiring, job structuring, targeting subservience, and avoiding native-born workers, are all
couched in terms of worker choice. Alternative sociological theories provide a counter-narrative:
employers take advantage of the social conditions that make brown collar workers subservient by
setting workplace conditions and pay rates.
There is no adequate place in the current anti-discrimination frameworks for such a
narrative. This article explores the power of the anti-subordination principle to recognize employer
preferences for the subservient worker as a possible form of discrimination. It suggests that
incorporation of the alternative sociological theories into current Title VII frameworks can provide
a remedy for brown collar workers seeking the advancement opportunities that the American
dream promises.
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THE EMPLOYER PREFERENCE FOR THE SUBSERVIENT WORKER AND THE MAKING OF THE
BROWN COLLAR WORKPLACE

“There’s no doubt that the Mexicans, filled with dignity, willingness and ability to work, are doing
jobs that not even Blacks want to do there in the United States.”1
“The greater the demand [in the workplace] for subordination, the more likely it is that fitness for
subordination, even subservience, will loom large in the employer’s eyes.”2
“Ultimately, the significance of the race question is about the intentionality of those who make
hiring decisions and consequently have tremendous powers over people’s daily lives. In this
respect, it is important to demystify the social mechanisms of labor recruitment and hiring and
place the subjectivity of the employers at the center of the discussion.”3
Introduction
In what is an age-old problem in the structure of our economic system, one group of
workers is perpetually consigned to the least desirable, segregated jobs in our economy. In the
latest twist, Latino immigrants – brown collar workers 4 – fill the positions, in large part, because
of their subservience.

Meanwhile, the myth of unwanted jobs that no one else but Latino

immigrants will take persists.5 This article explores how employers create these “unwanted” jobs

1

CNN.com, Fox ‘Regrets’ Remark about Blacks (May 17, 2005), available at
http://www.cnn.com/virtual/editions/europe/2000/roof/change.pop/frameset.exclude.html.

2

ROGER WALDINGER AND MICHAEL LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS: IMMIGRATION AND
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR, 144 (University of California, 2003). Waldinger and Lichter explain how
employers view their preferred workforces and why they choose immigrant workers for certain jobs.
3

Edward J.W. Park, Racial Ideology and Hiring Decisions in Silicon Valley, 22 QUALITATIVE
SOCIOLOGY 223, 231 (1999).
4

I define the “brown collar workplace” as one in which newly arrived Latino immigrants are
overrepresented in jobs or occupations. Because the newly arrived Latino can be documented or undocumented, it is
less immigration status than the employer’s perception of the worker as a newly arrived immigrant that marks the
identity of the brown collar worker. Infra, sec. I.
5

This popular view is reflected in the assumptions of the media, immigrant advocates, employers
and policy makers. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Who Left the Door Open?, TIME, Sept. 20,
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through their preferences for subservient workers.6

It analyzes the creation of brown collar

workplaces by focusing, first, on the conditions that create brown collar subservience and second,
on employer practices that target workers for their subservience. Today’s legal frameworks do not
adequately capture the form of discrimination lurking in the interplay between brown collar
workers accepting the jobs no one else will take and employers seeking subservient workers. That
inadequacy is a direct consequence of the law and economics assumptions reflected in antidiscrimination decisions that prevent protection through Title VII enforcement.

This article

suggests the incorporation of three alternative sociological theories into the existing frameworks so
that brown collar workers can seek adequate remedies.7

2004 (“One of the arguments that is regularly advanced to justify hiring
illegal workers is that they are merely doing jobs American workers
won't take. President Bush echoed the theme earlier this year when he
proposed the immigration-law changes that would allow millions of
illegals to live and work in the U.S.: "I put forth what I think is a very
reasonable proposal, and a humane proposal, one that is not amnesty,
but, in fact, recognizes that there are good, honorable, hardworking
people here doing jobs Americans won't do."”).
6

See generally Edward J. W. Park, Racial Ideology and Hiring Decisions in Silicon Valley, supra
note 3 (analyzing the role of racial ideology in employer preferences for immigrant workers over Blacks for high
technology jobs in the Silicon Valley).
7

If the obstacles to brown collar claims discussed in this article were removed, the remedies would
remain limited to providing advancement opportunities. The limitations in the remedies – especially the limitation
on improving conditions in the “unwanted” jobs – are the topic of a separate article. In short, no framework exists to
challenge segregated workplaces per se. If a brown collar worker claims differential treatment, he will need to show
that the employer targeted him because of some immutable characteristic connected to national origin (or some other
protected category). As circumstantial evidence of such targeting, he will need to compare his treatment to that of
other groups. Such other groups do not exist because of the segregated character of the jobs.
A brown collar worker who claims that a facially neutral employment practice has a disparate impact on a
protected group will have difficulty with standing because he was hired into the position. If he sues based on the
terms and conditions of the position, he will have to compare the treatment of his protected group with that of other
groups, which, again, do not exist because of the segregated character of the job. In other words, neither of the
current Title VII frameworks provide a remedy to fix the “unwanted” job. Leticia Saucedo, The Brown Collar
Workplace: Seeking the Solution for the Inexorable 100 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Section I of this article defines the brown collar worker. It analyzes the social conditions
that contribute to the brown collar worker’s subservience. It then describes the harmful effects of
segregated workplaces.
Section II discusses how the social dilemma transforms into a legal dilemma for brown
collar workers. It exposes the myth that brown collar jobs are a natural consequence of economic
trends and labor market conditions. It describes the methods that employers use to target brown
collar workers for segregated jobs. It then analyzes the effect of employer targeting on native-born
minority workers.

It analyzes the problems for brown collar workers with the current legal

frameworks
Section III explores, as background, the mainstream economic theories, including the
neoclassical economic theory that underlies current interpretations of anti-discrimination law. It
describes how the theory justifies the existence of segregated workplaces and it illustrates the
operation of neoclassical economic theory in examples from case law.
Section IV discusses three sociological theories that provide an alternative narrative for
explaining the large role the employer plays in creating segregated workplaces. These theories
explain how employer behavior and preferences influence employment structures, as well as
methods used to create segregated workplaces. This section illustrates the operation of the three
theories in sociological case studies, as well as in cases challenging subjective employment
practices.
Section V offers recommendations that open the way for a remedy for brown collar
workers. It suggests incorporating the alternative sociological theories and their narratives into
current anti-discrimination frameworks. It concludes that the legal mechanisms must exist for

7

brown collar workers to challenge their treatment within the anti-discrimination context if there is
any hope for eliminating the segregation and working conditions that characterize the “unwanted”
job.
I. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA: THE SUBSERVIENT BROWN COLLAR WORKER AND THE
SEGREGATED WORKPLACE
The problem of the brown collar worker is a growing social dilemma. The brown collar
worker is increasingly present in large numbers in the low wage sectors of our economy. The
social conditions that contribute to a brown collar worker’s subservience combine to create a
particularly vulnerable workforce. The harmful effects of being segregated into these “unwanted”
jobs demonstrate why brown collar workers need the protections of anti-discrimination laws.
A.

The “Brown Collar” Worker and “Overrepresentation” in the Segregated
Workplace

A “brown collar” worker is a newly arrived Latino8 who works in jobs or occupations in
which Latinos are overrepresented.9 As a general matter, brown collar workers experience wage
penalties, occupational segregation,10 and pay degradation because of their status in the workplace.11

8

“Latino,” as it is used in this article, encompasses those born in, or with ancestry from, Mexico, or
Central or South American countries, or from the Spanish-speaking Caribbean.
9

The term “brown collar” comes from sociologist Lisa Catanzarite, who coined the term to describe
the workplace conditions of these workers in mostly low-wage industries. Lisa Catanzarite, Dynamics of
Segregation and Earnings in Brown-Collar Occupations, 29 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 300, 301 (2002); Lisa
Catanzarite, Occupational Context and Wage Competition of New Immigrant Latinos with Minorities and Whites, 31
REVIEW OF BLACK POLITICAL ECONOMY (August 2004), reprinted in STEVEN SHULMAN, THE IMPACT OF
IMMIGRATION ON AFRICAN AMERICANS at 59 (2004); Lisa Catanzarite, Wage Penalties in Brown-Collar
Occupations, LATINO POLICY AND ISSUES BRIEF NO. 8 (UCLA Chicano Studies Research Ctr., Los Angeles, Cal.);
Lisa Catanzarite and Michael Bernabe Aguilera, Working with Co-Ethnics: Earnings Penalties for Latino
Immigrants at Latino Jobsites, 49 SOC. PROBS.101 (2002); Lisa Catanzarite, Race-Gender Composition and
Occupational Pay Degradation, 50 Soc. Probs. 14 (2003).
10

Lisa Catanzarite, Dynamics of Segregation, supra note 9 at 303; Maude-Toussaint Comeau,
Thomas Smith, and Ludovic Comeau, Jr., Occupational Attainment and Mobility of Hispanics in a Changing
Economy, A Report to the Pew Hispanic Center 23-25 (2005), http//: www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/59.1.pdf
(hereinafter, “Pew Occupational Mobility Study”). Both of these sources describe an index of segregation, which
measures the percentage of Latinos who would have to switch occupations to gain an integrated workforce. The
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They are increasingly concentrated in low-wage industries such as construction, hospitality, and
service.12 The term “brown collar worker” defines an increasingly large sector of the American
labor pool.13 It is the fastest-growing segment of the labor force today.14 Latino employment
increased by one million workers in 2004,15 the very large majority of which was driven by
immigrant labor.16
The definition of a brown collar worker includes the segregated nature of the work,
exemplified by overrepresentation. “Overrepresentation” in the brown collar worker context means
that a disproportionate number of workers compared to the general population work in the particular
job or occupation.
“Overrepresentation” in the brown collar context is important for what it represents: a
segregated workplace with a growing underclass of Latino workers. Because the current Latino
immigration stream has lasted longer than in previous European immigration cycles,17 earlier-arrived

index demonstrates that newly arrived immigrants have higher degrees of segregation in the industries where they are
concentrated.
11

Lisa Catanzarite, Dynamics of Segregation, supra note 9, at 301.

12

These industries cannot go off-shore for their labor, so they must draw employees to their market
from any available source. Rakesh Kochhar, Survey of Mexican Migrants: The Economic Transition to America
(2005), available at http:// pewhispanic.org/files/reports/58.pdf (hereinafter, “Pew Mexican Migrants Survey”); See
generally Lisa Catanzarite, Occupational Context and Wage Competition, supra note 9.
13

See Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 1; Pew Mexican Migrants Survey, supra
note 12, at 1; Rakesh Kochhar, Latino Labor Report 2004: More Jobs for Immigrants but at Lower Wages 6 (May 2,
2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/45.pdf (hereinafter, “Pew Labor Report 2004").
14

Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 87.

15

The total job growth amounted to 2.5 million jobs. Pew Labor Report 2004, supra note 13, at 6.

16

More than 950,000 workers were immigrants. The employment levels of brown collar workers
increased by 914,000 jobs, or 88% of the total Latino growth in employment in 2004. Id. at 8.
17
Frank. D. Bean, Susan Gonzalez-Baker, and Randy Capps, Immigration and Labor Markets in the
United States, 669, 689, in SOURCEBOOK OF LABOR MARKETS (Berg and Kalleberg, eds. 2001).
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and native-born Latino workers continue to work alongside brown collar workers. Employers,
therefore, can access a steady supply of labor for the “unwanted” jobs in America’s economy.
B.

Social Conditions that Contribute to the Brown Collar Worker’s Subservience

One of the defining characteristics of brown collar workers is their “newly arrived” status.
Several elements of “newly arrived” status, including perceived immigration status, lack of
knowledge about workplace rights, political disenfranchisement, “push” factors, fear of job loss
and/or deportation, and language deficiencies, combine to create an especially vulnerable workforce.
“Newly arrived” defines someone who has entered the United States within the past four
years.18 The term applies regardless of the immigration status19 of the individual.20 Nonetheless, a
large portion of the brown collar labor pool is presumed to be undocumented.21 The high number of
undocumented workers – approximately 70% – among the recently-arrived category signals their
vulnerability.22 The vast majority of those who entered the United States within the past two years
have no U.S.-government-issued identification, indicating presumptive undocumented status.23

18

“Newly arrived” status is a term defined in the sociological literature. See Catanzarite, Wage
Penalties, supra note 9, at 301.
19

Immigration and documentation status are used interchangeably. The terms refer to whether one
has authorization to be present and work in the United States. See Beth Lyon, When More ‘Security Equals Less
Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
REV.571, 574-580 (2004), for an in-depth description of the documentation categories.
20

A recent survey of over 4,500 Mexican migrants throughout the United States revealed that
although immigrants with documents may have more mobility than those without, all immigrants, regardless of
status, continue to be concentrated in one of four industries: agriculture, hospitality, construction, and manufacturing.
Pew Mexican Migrants Survey, supra note 12, at 14-16.
21

The numbers are estimates, since records of undocumented status are difficult to maintain. See
generally, Jeffrey S. Passel and Pew Hispanic Center, Estimate of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented
Population (March 2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=44.
22

Pew Mexican Migrants Survey, supra note 12, at 1; see also, Jeffrey S. Passel, Estimate of the Size
and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population, supra note 21.
23

Pew Mexican Migrants Survey, supra note 12, at 10-11.
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Newly arrived Latino workers know less about their workplace culture or workplace rights
than native-born workers.24 Less educated than their native-born counterparts, they often do not
know they can complain about violations of their rights.25 They do not perceive, as do their nativeborn counterparts, that they have greater workplace rights than they actually do.26 In fact, because of
their “newly arrived” status, they tend to perceive the opposite. High levels of unemployment, poor
living conditions, and political instability create “push” factors for Latino workers who enter the
United States seeking stable working conditions, which they believe will be better in the United
States than at home.27 The need to support families in their home countries motivates them to work
in even the most adverse conditions employers offer in the United States.28 The current political
climate encourages the differences in treatment between the rights of native born and immigrant
workers, especially those entering from southern borders.29

24

WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 164-165.

25

Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 56-57.

26

Pauline Kim provides an empirically based analysis of the differences between employee
perceptions and attitudes about their workplace rights and their actual rights. She finds that employees perceive that
they have more robust rights than they actually do. See generally, Pauline Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL LAW REVIEW
105 (1997).
27

KEITH GRINT, SOCIOLOGY AT WORK, 256-57(Cambridge 2005); WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW
THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2 at 5; MICHAEL J. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT LABOR AND
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES, 189 (Cambridge 1979).
28

Beth Lyon, When More Security Equals Less Workplace Safety, supra note 19, at 593 n.119.

29

At the time of this writing, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4437, which increased the
sanctions for those working in the United States without employment authorization. This proposal will likely chill
efforts to gain workplace rights for immigrants workers, regardless of documentation status. At least six more such
onerous bills were considered in the 109th legislative session of Congress. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2006).
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Newly arrived workers fear more than job loss. They are subservient in large part because
they fear deportation, either their own or family members’.30 It is almost impossible for most newly
arrived workers to obtain legal status under current immigration law, which restricts the number of
unskilled worker visas to 10,000.31

The only alternative for obtaining a visa requires family

sponsorship by a close relative.32 Even then, immigration law deems someone who entered or
worked in the United States without authorization inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment to legal
permanent resident status.33

Similarly, changes in immigration law have imposed harsh

consequences on immigrant workers who enter illegally and who are unlawfully present.34 These
components of the immigration system create an atmosphere of fear among undocumented workers,
as well as documented workers who have undocumented family members and friends.
Newly arrived workers fear ‘rocking the boat’ at work because recent court rulings have
limited the rights of immigrant workers in the workplace. For example, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds threatened the effectiveness of undocumented worker
organizing efforts by limiting the remedies available to such workers suffering from employers’
unfair labor practices.35 The case opened the way for a number of challenges to undocumented

30

Juliet Stumpf and Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law: One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back? 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUBL. POL’Y 131, 145 (2002).
31

INA §§ 203(b)(3)(A)(iii); 203(b)(3)(B).

32

INA § 203(A).

33

INA § 245(c).

34

INA § 212(a)(9)(B). An immigrant who is unlawfully present in the U.S. for more than six months
and leaves the country could be barred from re-entering the U.S. for between 3 and 10 years. This provision of
immigration law actually creates an incentive for the undocumented population to remain in the U.S. as long as they
are undetected, rather than risk the three- and ten-year bars.
35

Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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worker rights in other areas of employment and labor law, including challenges under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, state worker compensation and wage statutes, and Title VII.36 Hoffman also provided
an impetus for co-workers to challenge the presence of immigrant workers in the workplace.37
Likewise, employer sanctions provisions, which penalize knowingly hiring undocumented workers,
have rendered them even more exploitable.38
Newly arrived workers are disenfranchised informally, because of their “new” status in the
community. Language deficiencies keep them from moving freely across jobs.39 Many of the jobs
that newly arrived Latinos find do not require English speaking abilities, although any movement out
of those jobs requires English language fluency.40 As outsiders they do not become involved in local
affairs, nor do they tend to exercise collective political will. They are also disenfranchised formally.
Because they have no political rights in this country until they become citizens, they cannot exercise
36

Courts have held that the Hoffman holding does not apply in many of these contexts. E.g., Rivera
v. Nibco, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) ( the court held that Hoffman Plastics did not apply in Title VII cases); Cano
v. Mallory Mgmt.,195 Misc.2d 666, 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818(N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (noting that "every case citing
Hoffman since it was rendered has either distinguished itself from it or has limited it greatly"); De La Rosa v. N.
Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238-39 (C.D.Ill.2002) (holding that “Hoffman was not "dispositive of the issues
raised in the motion to compel" discovery of immigration status in a Title VII action); cf. Escobar v. Spartan Sec.
Serv., 281 F.Supp.2d 895, 897 (S.D.Tex.2003) (holding that Hoffman "did not specifically foreclose all remedies for
undocumented workers under either the National Labor Relations Act or other comparable federal labor statutes");
Flores v. Albertson’s, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6171, 2002 WL 1163623, *5 (C.D.Cal. Apr.9, 2002) (finding
Hoffman inapplicable to an FLSA action);Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (holding
that Hoffman does not apply in FLSA actions, and granting a protective order from discovery of immigration status);
Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (questioning the applicability of
Hoffman to the FLSA and denying the employer’s request for discovery of immigration status).
E.g., Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted in part,
126 S.Ct. 830 (Dec. 12, 2005); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 612-620, 622 (6th Cir. 2004);
Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendants were direct victims of
alleged racketeering), class certification granted, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13027 (E.D. Wash. July 13, 2004);
Commercial Cleaning Services L.L.C. v. Colin Service Systems, Inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001) (sustaining RICO
complaint alleging hiring of undocumented workers).
37

38

INA § 274A.

39

Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 57-58.

40

Id.
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voting rights.41 Disenfranchisement and inability to participate in civic affairs fuels the treatment of
newly arrived workers as the “other,” both in the community and in the workplace.42
These characteristics are bound up in the brown collar worker’s identity. For employers
categorizing their workforce, these characteristics, which are “inherently” linked to national origin,
form part of the workers’ identity. As one employer noted, “[t]he Latinos in our locations, most are
recent arrivals.

Most are tenuously here, and here on fragile documents.

I see them as

subservient.”43 These pre-conceived ideas about brown collar workers – which are, in reality, ideas
based on their social conditions – influence the employer’s use of national origin as a proxy for the
subservient worker.44
Because employers so link the brown collar worker with national origin, the “brown collar
workplace” is characterized by newly arrived immigrants working alongside earlier-arrived and
native-born Latino workers. Reflecting the social reality of mixed-status families, worker treatment
in mixed-status workplaces affects all Latinos, regardless of documentation status. As one historian
notes:
[t]he presence of large illegal populations in Asian and Latino communities has historically
contributed to the construction of those communities as illegitimate, criminal, and
unassimilable. Indeed, the association of these minority groups as unassimilable foreigners
has led to the creation of ‘alien citizens’ – persons who are American citizens by virtue of

41

LPR’s who try to vote are deportable. INA § 237(a)(6)(A).

42

MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS 62 (2004).

43

WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 163. Waldinger and
Lichter’s interviews of employer preferences revealed observations such as the one provided by this employer, who
described how his perception of the workers’ social conditions played into his decisionmaking about who to hire for
certain jobs. See discussion, section IV.D., infra.
44

See discussion, section IV.D., infra.
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their birth in the United States but who are presumed to be foreign by the mainstream of
American culture, and at times, by the state.45
Even documented workers, fearing for their own continuing legalization status, are affected.
Current immigration law penalizes legally admitted immigrants through criminal and non-criminal
reasons for deportation. Conviction of a domestic violence crime or violation of a protection order,
for example, makes a documented immigrant deportable.46 The trend toward restrictive deportation
laws makes even documented workers more vulnerable to deportation threats. Current proposed
legislation penalizes as an aggravated felony, and therefore, a deportable offense, driving while
under the influence of alcohol.47 It would also punish smuggling a family member across the
border.48 The increasingly restrictive character of immigration law chills the workplace activism of
documented immigrants, who do not want to draw unnecessary attention to themselves.
The effects extend even to native-born Latinos, especially those who fit the Latino immigrant
profile. Kitty Calavita analyzes the dilemma of this group as one in which, “immigration law and
economics work together to establish immigrant otherness, even as economic realities ensure that
many who are formal citizens are similarly cast as strangers in a process that both is fortified by law

45

Mae M. Ngai, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 42, at 2.

46

INA § 237(a)(2)(E).

47

H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2006).

48

Current law considers smuggling an aggravated felony and deportable offense, but it exempts the
smuggling of family members from its definition of smuggling. I.N.A. 237(a)(1)(E)(I), (ii); I.N.A. 101(a)(43)(N).
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and undermines legal distinctions.”49 The conditions in the brown collar workplace, therefore, harm
all Latinos who work in it.50
All of these characteristics contribute to the brown collar worker’s subservience. They
combine to create a particularly constricted set of choices for brown collar workers in the U.S. labor
market.51 These same factors, not coincidentally, influence employer preferences for these workers
to fill “unwanted” jobs. The social constraints, including perceived immigration status, the climate
of fear, educational and language deficiencies, political disenfranchisement – all of the
characteristics that define the brown collar worker – color the employer’s perceptions of
subservience.
E.

The Harmful Effects of Segregated Workplaces
1.

The Wage Differential Effects

Brown collar workers experience wage differentials over time as a result of their segregated
status.52 Wage differentials and segregation correlate positively with the percentage of brown collar
workers in a job.53 Wages for Latino workers have continued to fall relative to wages in non-Latino
occupations. Real weekly earnings declined in 2004 for the second year in a row for Latinos.54

49

Kitty Calavita, Law, Citizenship and the Construction of (Some) Immigrant ‘Others’, 30 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 401, 402 (2005).
50

Id.

51

For an excellent and thorough analysis of the effects of choices on worker and employer
preferences and vice versa, see Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice: An Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073
(1992).
52

Lisa Catanzarite, Wage Penalties, supra note 9, at 1-2.

53

Id. at 1.

54

Pew Labor Report 2004, supra note 13, at 2. Latinos are the only major group for whom wages
fell two years in a row. Id.
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These statistics are consistent with sociological data showing wage suppression and unstable wages
in industries that become brown collar over a period of time.55
2.

Occupational Status Gap and Segmented Market Effects

The occupational status gap between Latinos and whites increased over the 1990-2000
decade.56 Wage comparisons by occupation reveal that brown collar workers experienced slower
occupational mobility, regardless of educational status.57 A recent report for the Pew Hispanic
Center describes Latinos’ low occupational and mobility rates as follows:
An occupational bifurcation has resulted whereby more and more Hispanic workers are in
occupations with lower socioeconomic status, while fewer non-Hispanic workers hold these
jobs. At the same time, more non-Hispanic workers have occupations with higher
occupational status while fewer Hispanic workers have these occupations.58
The Latino immigration experience is characterized by a very slow incorporation and, at
times, nonexistent movement up economic and social ladders.59 Industry shifts to more segmented
occupational ladders have increased the employment of Latinos in the low wage, low status
occupations.60 More importantly, the higher the percentage of brown collar workers, the more all
Latinos, regardless of their status or place of birth, experience segregation in the worksite.61 Over
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See generally, Lisa Catanzarite, Wage Penalties, supra note 9; Abel Valenzuela, et al. On the
Corner: Day Labor in the United States, 10-12 (2006), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/index.php/.
56

Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 59.
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Id.
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Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 39. Job mobility over time remains limited.
Lisa Catanzarite, Wage Penalties, supra note 9, at 1-3.
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MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 42, at 5.
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Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 29, 47, 88-89.
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Catanzarite, Wage Penalties, supra note 9, at 1.
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time, they suffer wage disparities and wage suppression at a higher rate than their non-segregated
counterparts.62
II.

THE LEGAL DILEMMA: DISMANTLING THE MYTH OF THE UNWANTED JOB AND
TARGETING EMPLOYER PREFERENCES FOR THE SUBSERVIENT WORKER
Employers’ targeting of brown collar workers as proxies for subservience deserves legal

scrutiny, as do the mechanisms employers utilize to carry out their preferences. The myth that no
one but immigrants will take brown collar jobs obscures employer intentionality in targeting brown
collar workers. The brown collar workplace is not, in fact, part of a natural process of immigrant
incorporation into the economy.

Current legal doctrine and theory create barriers, however,

especially given the strong message that brown collar workers “choose” these jobs.
A.

The Myth of the “Unwanted” Job
The myth of the “unwanted” job is simply that brown collar workers will take the jobs no one

else wants. There is more to the employment arrangement between brown collar workers and
employers, however. Employers choose the ethnic composition of their workforces when they set
pay rates and working conditions for particular positions.63 They can also pre-select who will or will
not take a job by employing such policies as allowing languages other than English to be spoken on
the job in some positions and not in others. This job structuring process creates a set of jobs or
occupations that employers reserve for brown collar workers.64 The simple reality is that no one –

62

Lisa Catanzarite, Race-Gender Composition, supra note 9, at 29; Lisa Catanzarite, Dynamics of
Segregation and Earnings, supra note 9, at 303.
63

Debra C. Malamud, Affirmative Action and Ethnic Niches, 336, in COLOR LINES (John David
Skretny, ed. 2001).
64
The side effect of employers reserving jobs for Latino immigrants is that, for a myriad of reasons,
they do not offer them to native born workers, especially African Americans. See WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW
THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 17-20, 187-191; Edward J.W. Park, Racial Ideology, supra note 3, at 229;
Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Why So Many Blacks Fear Illegal Immigrants,
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not even the immigrants who fill them – really “wants” these jobs, at least in the form they now
exist. The jobs have so deteriorated in pay and conditions after becoming “immigrant” jobs that they
no longer resemble the jobs held by predecessor employees.65
The “immigrant job” myth coincides with a deeper myth regarding the historical
incorporation of immigrants into the economic life of our society. The “immigrant success story”
myth portrays the immigrant as starting at the bottom of the economic ladder and moving up in
steady progression over time.66 It allows for the popular perception that, with time, the brown collar
worker will assimilate and move up the economic ladder if only he desires to do so.67 In other
words, should the immigrant choose to invest in his own human capital, he will not suffer harmful
workplace conditions for long. The dominant myth, however, does not consider the degree to which

http://www.blacknews.com/pr/immigrants101.html (describing the perception in the African American community
that immigrants are taking jobs that Blacks are not offered).
65

Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace, supra note 127 at 312-313, 324325 (2004). Considerable social science research describes the devaluation of jobs once they are associated with a
protected class. See, e.g., Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Sex Composition and Gendered Earnings Inequality: A
Comparison of Job and Occupational Models, in GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK, 23 (Jerry Jacobs ed., 1995);
Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos, JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES 11-15 (1990).
66

See WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 4, for a description
of the traditional narrative of immigrants steadily ascending the occupation ladder. See also, RICHARD D. ALBA,
ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WHITE AMERICA (1990); Jennifer Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum
and the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1409 (1995) (“The tale of
European immigration – embodying the powerful concepts of freedom, independence and self-sufficiency through
wage work as they have been reinterpreted since the nineteenth century – provides a dominant ‘text’ against which
social and political claims are made and measured in the twentieth century.”). Notably, at least one scholar suggests
that a similar myth for Blacks masks inequities that hinder their advancement. Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Tricky
Magic: Blacks as Immigrants and the Paradox of Foreignness, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 86-88 (1999).
67

MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 42, at 5 ( “the myth of immigrant America
derives its power in large part from the labor it performs for American exceptionalism. . . . . the myth ‘shores up the
national narrative of liberal consensual citizenship, allowing a disaffected citizenry to experience its regime as
choiceworthy, to see it through the eyes of still-enchanted newcomers whose choice to come here . . . reenact[s]
liberalism’s . . . fictive foundation in individual acts of uncoerced consent.”).
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brown collar workers’ choices are constrained by social and legal policies. Nor does it acknowledge
how employers take advantage of those constraints.
The myth of the “unwanted” job masks the degree to which employer perceptions about who
will be the subservient worker influence the creation of segregated workplaces.

Societal and

governmental treatment of Latino immigrants, in general, fuel these stereotypes. Once brown collar
workers occupy a job, employers will devalue the position and its function, pay rate, terms and
conditions, and advancement ladder. Employer biases infect the hiring process to create the brown
collar jobs in the first place, and then influence the workplace conditions after the job is considered
an “immigrant” job.
Professor Debra Malamud acknowledges the difficulty in challenging brown collar
workplaces precisely because they conform to the narrative of the employer as an innocent
participant in a natural process.68

In this narrative, the ethnic niche is a normal and natural

consequence of immigrant incorporation into American society.69

Rather than an oppressive

environment, the brown collar workplace is seen as a nurturing training ground that develops skills
and human capital for those who enter it.
Given the power of the myth’s narrative, current disparate impact and disparate treatment
frameworks may be too weak to dismantle the brown collar structure simply because no one
perceives it as a structure. If the myth prevails, an individual employer cannot be held responsible

68

Debra C. Malamud, Affirmative Action and Ethnic Niches, supra note 63, at 336.

69

Id. (“There is an increasing tendency in the courts to view the disparate impact cause of action as
a tool that ought to be reserved for circumstances in which there is reason to believe that impermissible intentional
discrimination is taking place. It may well be that courts view the immigrant-business ethnic niche as so natural and
normal that it is unlikely to be the product of intentional discrimination . . . . Or it may simply be that case that courts
are so committed to these ethnic niches as part of the ongoing success story of American immigration that they are
unwilling to use the powerful tool of disparate impact litigation to dismantle them.”).
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for the historically inevitable employment patterns surrounding immigrant workforces.70 Decision
makers who view brown collar workplaces as inevitable conclude that employees who stay in
unwanted jobs suffer from societal discrimination or lack of human capital, and not from the effect
of deliberate employer practices.
B.

Employer Intentionality: Targeting the Brown Collar Worker
Employer preference for subservience manifests itself in “inclusionary” and “exclusionary”

aspects of discrimination.

In the brown collar context, discrimination occurs in the interplay

between network hiring, targeting subservience and job structuring. Consequently, the brown collar
worker becomes the target of the inclusionary aspect of discrimination.

Native-born workers,

particularly other minorities, are the victims of the “exclusionary” aspect of this discrimination.
1.

Network Hiring

Employers conduct word-of-mouth hiring through social networks that immigrants develop.71
For Latino immigrant workers, insider referrals account for the bulk of informal job matching
possibilities.72 In brown collar workplaces, network hiring is a major form of recruitment. Network
hiring, in turn, produces an overrepresentation of brown collar workers. This self-perpetuating
process produces a steady stream of subservient workers for the “unwanted” job.73
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Id.
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WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 11.
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James R. Elliott, Referral Hiring and Ethnically Homogeneous Jobs: How Prevalent is the
Connection and for Whom?, 30 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 401, 421 (2001) (concluding that Latinos are more likely
than native-born Whites to enter jobs through insider referrals).
73

In the typical case, network hiring has been analyzed as a structure that keeps workers out of the
hiring loop. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Consol.
Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993); NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 693 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982); Domingo v.
New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984); Debra C. Malamud, Affirmative Action and Ethnic Niches,
supra note 63, at 336; see also, Barbara Reskin, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT, 32-34
(Washington 1998), for a concise explanation of network hiring as a discriminatory practice that entrenches the
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2.

Structuring the Job: The Creation of the “Unwanted” Job and the
Segregated Workplace

Employers pre-determine the ethnic composition of their workforce by setting pay rates and
conditions for certain jobs. This form of job structuring attracts certain workers to those and deters
others from seeking them.74 Processes such as up-skilling and down-skilling75 of jobs, and the
movement toward more contingent job structures, are examples of practices that perpetuate
segregated workplaces. The de-skilling of jobs, for instance, creates opportunities at the entry level
but little-to-no advancement opportunities for brown collar workers. The process evolves naturally
because employers create job descriptions based on who they think will take the jobs.76 De-skilling
facilitates the hiring of unskilled workers for jobs that once required a variety of skills. Employers’
compartmentalization of skills needed for jobs contributes to market segmentation, which hinders
advancement for workers entering at the bottom of the economic ladder. The trend toward an
employment model with short advancement ladders and dead-end jobs reduces opportunities over the
long-term, especially at the lower end of the skills spectrum.77
3.

Targeting Subservience

racial, ethnic and sex composition of a workplace.
74

Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 91, 100-104 (2003).
75

‘Up-skilling and ‘down-skilling’ occurs when employers reconstruct jobs to make them more
specialized, An up-skilled job requires almost exclusively skilled job tasks. A down-skilled job requires fewer to no
skills. Before restructuring, a particular job included both skilled and unskilled tasks.
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This structuring of jobs has been analyzed in the context of race and gender. See, e.g., Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 74, at 110; Barbara Reskin, THE REALITIES OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 73, at 35 (“By designing jobs based on the assumption that one
sex or another will hold them, employers create structural barriers against women filling specific jobs.”).
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Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 69, at 100-101.

22

Employer preferences for the subservient worker, by themselves, do not signal the existence of
discriminatory practices. The hiring process turns discriminatory when the employer uses race or
national origin as a proxy for choosing the subsrvient worker. This is true even if the employer may
not consciously have equated subservience with an ethnic category.78
Employers target the newly arrived Latino population for the least desirable, often lowest paid
jobs in the workplace, precisely because they perceive and anticipate the subservience of Latino
immigrants.

In the case of brown collar workers, perceptions about the compliant nature of

immigrant workers are generated, in part, through unconscious or automatic stereotypes about
immigrant workers,79 and such stereotypes certainly exist.80 Employer perceptions are reflected in
workers’ pay, working conditions, assignments, and status within a company. Because employers
tend not to distinguish between newly arrived and other immigrants at the bottom of the economic
ladder, national origin maintains its power as a proxy for subservience.
Employers intentionally target brown collar workers for certain jobs because of their
subservient character – this is the inclusionary impact of discrimination. Once an employer begins to
target a particular ethnic group, the company relies on network hiring to fill positions. These three

78

WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 152. Ironically,
workers embrace the characteristics that employers seek in order to become more attractive to employers, thus
converting employers’ perceptions about group characteristics into reality. Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati argue that this phenomenon should be captured in the anti–discrimination frameworks. Devon Carbado and
Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1269-70 (2000).
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See Barbara Reskin, Imagining Work Without Exclusionary Barriers, 14 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW
321 (2002) (“The automatic nature of stereotyping helps to maintain stereotypes, despite
evidence that they are inaccurate . . . . we are more likely to stereotype when we are under time pressure, partly
because stereotyping conserves mental resources.”).
AND FEMINISM 313,
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WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 155-180 (describing
the prejudices and stereotypes about immigrant workers and native born minorities that influence employer decision
making).
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mechanisms – targeting, structuring, and network hiring – combine to maintain racially and ethnically
stratified worksites.81
4.

Avoiding Hiring Native Born Workers for The “Unwanted” Job

On the other side of the equation, employers avoid hiring native-born workers, especially
African Americans, for these jobs. This, of course, is the exclusionary impact of discrimination.
Employers provide all kinds of reasons for avoiding native born workers, although foremost among
them is the perception that native-born workers are more willing to exercise their workplace rights to
the detriment of the company. The following excerpt of an employer interview illustrates this
perception:
As a small businessman, my main fear is having a worker who is bent on filing formal
complaints or lawsuits. It would surely drive me out of business. As I see it, Asians and
Mexicans are generally not like that. If they have a problem, they try and solve it personally,
or they just go to another company. But whites and blacks, they like to stand up for their
rights, even if it means they can drive me out of business and all of the other workers los their
jobs. For blacks, I’m afraid that they will not just involve lawyers but bring outsiders, like the
NAACP or the Black Panther’s Party or whatever they have now. Then I’m really dead.82
These employer assumptions about who should and should not fill certain jobs influence how
employers set pay rates and conditions for the jobs. They also influence who will take the jobs once
the jobs are structured. Native-born workers will not fill these jobs, precisely because the pay rate,
conditions, and opportunities for advancement do not fulfill the expectations of native born workers.
In other words, “racial discrimination finds different expressions for different groups: the same racial
logic that causes employers to avoid African Americans and whites make[s] . . . Latinos more

81
Other studies confirm the patterns described in the Waldinger/Lichter study. See, e.g., Edward J.
W. Park, Racial Ideology, supra note 3, at 227-28 (describing ethnic hiring processes for unskilled labor in high
technology industries).
82

Id. at 230.
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attractive.”83 To complete the cycle, as jobs become culturally labeled as “immigrant jobs,” native
workers refrain from competing for them or seek to move out of them.84
A devaluation process occurs over time, as reflected in wage suppression statistics of
segregated workplaces. If employers structured jobs differently, the available or interested labor pool
for them would likely include more native born workers.85 The devaluation cycle demonstrates the
role of employers’ discriminatory attitudes in creating and maintaining inferior job structures for
brown collar workers.
C.

The Current Legal Framework and its Theoretical Underpinnings
1.

The Statute and the Current Frameworks

In theory, Title VII is broad enough to target and eliminate employer practices that classify
workers into segregated jobs. Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII states,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.86
The EEOC Compliance Manual, which guides the federal government’s employment discrimination
investigations, lists as examples of classification: “assigning women and minorities to menial, dirty,
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Id. at 231.
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See Gordon de Jong and Michele Steinmetz, Receptivity Attitudes and the Occupational
Attainment of Male and Female Immigrant Workers, 23 POPULATIONS RESEARCH AND POLICY REVIEW 91, 95;
Douglas Massey, Why Does Immigration Occur? in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE at 43-52 (Hirschman, et al., eds.1999); WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF
WORKS, supra note 2, at 153.
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See Scott Baker, Defining ‘Otherwise Qualified Applicants’: Applying an Antitrust RelevantMarket Analysis to Disparate Impact Cases, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 725, 746 (2000).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
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confining, less desirable, less prestigious, nonsupervisory, and lower paying jobs.”87 Notably, these
are the same types of practices that create brown collar workplaces. The data in the first part of this
article show that brown collar workers fill the least desirable, lowest-paying, wage suppressed,
menial jobs in the economy. These jobs also transform quickly into segregated jobs once the public
perceives them as “immigrant jobs.”
Lawsuits challenging the existence of a brown collar workplace arise in one of two contexts.
First, plaintiffs excluded from the brown collar workplace challenge employer practices that create
barriers to those jobs.88

Second, workers in brown collar jobs challenge barriers to their

opportunities for advancement.89 In the case of brown collar workers, the plaintiffs must show that
they are targeted for the least desirable jobs and have been denied opportunities available to nonLatinos, because of their national origin. For purposes of this article, I will focus on obstacles for
brown collar workers in the second context.
Why do brown collar workers resist pursuing claims to escape their segregated working
conditions?90

In part, they resist because interpretation of current proof frameworks hinders

87

EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 618, Segregating, Limiting, and Classifying Employees,
618:0009 (BNA 2003).
88

Although this suit challenge seems unlikely because the targeted job is one that no one else wants,
plaintiffs brought such a claim in EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991).
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See, e.g., Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983); Nanty v. Barrows, 660
F.2d 1327 (9 Cir. 1981); Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 137,
148 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Butler v. Home Depot, 70
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51, 1996 WL 421436 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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Because there is no separate proof framework for dismantling segregated workplaces, there is no
straightforward method for improving the conditions in the existing job. The remedy for a claim in a segregation
lawsuit would likely be the improvement of conditions in the segregated workplace. Such a remedy presumably
would re-integrate the job once nonminority workers perceived that the terms and conditions were no longer
substandard. Likewise, the reintegration of the job would also ensure continued improvement in its terms and
conditions. A discussion of how this framework would operate is the subject of a separate article. Leticia Saucedo,
The Brown Collar Workplace: Seeking the Solution for the Inexorable 100 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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successful litigation. The frameworks establish the proof methods for showing by circumstantial
evidence that an employer has segregated, limited or classified employees “because of” a prohibited
reason.91 Meeting the “because of” element proves a difficult task for a brown collar worker, given
the prevailing narratives surrounding the willingness of brown collar workers to take the jobs no one
else wants.
1.

Disparate Impact Theory

In the disparate impact case, a plaintiff must show that an employment practice causes a
substantial adverse impact on a protected group.92 The plaintiff must identify a specific employment
practice that causes a substantial adverse impact on a protected group, unless “the complaining party
can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not
capable of separation for analysis.”93 In that case, “[T]he decisionmaking process may be analyzed
as one employment practice.”94 The difficulty in the brown collar context arises from a resistance to
the idea that the employer is involved in any practice, much less a discriminatory process.
Even when alleging that combined practices produce segregated brown collar workplaces,
brown collar plaintiffs must prove causation. To demonstrate causation, a plaintiff must “offer
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused
the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected

91

McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S.

4224 (1971).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(I) (2000).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(I) (2000).
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42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(B)(I) (2000); Stender v. Lucky Stores, 1992 WL 295957 at *2 (finding that
a defendant’s subjective decisionmaking process could be scrutinized as a process “not capable of separation for
analysis”).
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group.”95 An employer will argue that the brown collar worker takes the “unwanted” job, and stays
in it, by choice. An employer may also argue that he is simply seeking subservience, rather than
national origin. The plaintiff must be careful to – indeed, may not be able to – make clear causal
connections between the employer practice and the protected category.96 The myth that the market
determines a worker’s place, and that a brown collar worker’s place is inevitably at the lower end of
the economic ladder, proves intractable.
If the brown collar plaintiff meets the prima facie hurdle, the employer has the burden of
showing that the practice is “job-related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.”97 Under the current framework, if an employer does prove business necessity, a plaintiff
can then show that the employer failed to implement an effective alternative practice or selection
device that would have a less adverse impact in response to a business necessity defense.98 In the
brown collar context, the employer will argue that subservience is a job-related qualification for the
position at hand. Such an assertion provides another opportunity for assumptions about the brown
collar worker’s situation to infiltrate the decision maker’s determination.
2.

Disparate Treatment Theory

In the typical disparate treatment case – the most likely claim for a brown collar worker
challenging employer targeting – a plaintiff must show a prima facie case of intentional
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Id.
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See, Elaine Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still
Good For? What Not?, 42 Brandeis L.J. 597, 614-619 (2004) (warning about the “red herring” argument embedded
in disparate impact claims and of the need for plaintiffs to make strict causal connections between the employer
practice and the protected category).
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(I) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).

28

discrimination. In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiff’s prima facie case requires a showing
that the plaintiff is qualified for a targeted job, or that the plaintiff is similarly situated to those
outside the protected class, and received differential treatment.99 The employer must respond with a
legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason for its actions.100 The plaintiff must then establish that
the employer’s legitimate business reason is a pretext masking unlawful discrimination.101
Alternatively, a group of plaintiffs can show a pattern-or-practice of discrimination, by
demonstrating that differential treatment is the employer’s standard operating procedure.102 This
claims involves an allegation that the defendant’s conduct rises to the level of intentional
discrimination against a protected class. Here, the plaintiffs demonstrate through statistical evidence,
together with anecdotal evidence, the disparities that create an inference of discrimination.103
In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must show that the employer operates with some
sort of discriminatory motive in mind. In the early cases, a background assumption of employer
discrimination was unstated yet understood.104

Increasingly, courts have begun to accept the
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See e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303 (1977); Teamsters v. United
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based on the consideration of impermissible factors.”); see generally, Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997 (1994) (chronicling the shift among
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assumption that discrimination no longer exists).
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premise that employers are color blind.105 Thus, the existence of segregated jobs continues to be
judged as nothing more than a societally driven phenomenon. Debra Malamud suggests the dangers
of this interpretation:
[I]f facially neutral business decisions that are not (or not yet) subject to Title VII challenge
are perpetuating a labor market in which racial and ethnic segregation is an everyday
occurrence, then labor market segregation continues to be accepted as natural and normal.
The segregation caused by intentional discrimination does not stand out as clearly as it
otherwise would; it just becomes another thread in the segregated fabric of American life.
And segregation, which we still claim to reject in principle, becomes ever more accepted as
fact.106
The formal elements of an intentional discrimination claim – individual or class-based –
leave much room for an employer to provide alternative explanations for the existence of brown
collar segregated workplaces. If, for example, the differential treatment is for some reason that has
nothing to do with national origin, the employer may not be held liable for discriminatory
behavior.107 Arguably, the employer’s preference for subservient workers has absolutely nothing to
do with the employee’s national origin; it has more to do with the employee’s constricted choices
stemming from his social situation.108 If that is the case, the employer has not treated potential
candidates differentially by offering a job at a lower pay rate and with worse conditions that anyone
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Sheila Foster argues that the Court’s narrative “reveals a normative vision that the world in which
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can take. The formal doctrinal requirement that workers be treated the same is met. However, it
must be scrutinized more carefully to determine the employer’s true role.109
As another example, if differential treatment or impact can be explained as reflecting the
brown collar worker’s interests, the employer will not be held liable.110 The brown collar worker
case is actually the mirror image of the type of case which traditional anti-discrimination frameworks
typically address. The brown collar worker is “interested” in the job nobody else is interested in, so
he has not been “denied” the opportunity to fill that job. On the other hand, the employer argues, the
brown collar worker is not interested in other opportunities because they require skills he neither has
nor wants to acquire. The structure of the jobs, combined with increasing market segmentation, will
prevent the brown collar worker from showing he is “qualified” for advancement opportunities. The
skill gap may be too wide to bridge. Even if a brown collar worker could show that the employer’s
practice of relegating workers to low-wage jobs was a “standard operating procedure” as required in
a pattern-or-practice case, the brown collar worker would still have to show differential treatment of
similarly situated workers. In the increasingly segmented nature of the brown collar workplace,
proof problems will arise.
In short, the assumptions behind why immigrants take and keep these jobs are difficult to
overcome. For these reasons, the formal doctrine must be adjusted to fit the brown collar context.
109

Several scholars have written extensively on the need for the doctrines to incorporate employer
agency in the structuring of jobs that, in turn, affects employee interest and choices. See e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (introducing social science research showing
that women’s job preferences are based on structural and cultural features of employing organizations); Vicki
Schultz and Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice, supra note 51 (analyzing the relative success of the
lack of interest defense in title VII cases); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics, supra note 74
(suggesting the need for Title VII doctrine to emphasize structural factors that enable unconscious bias to enter into
workplace dynamics).
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A number of scholars have rebutted this argument in the gender and race context. Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories, supra note 109. The same type of evidence is necessary in the brown collar context.
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The next section discusses the assumptions – arising out of traditional economic theories – operating
within jurisprudence in the implementation of the doctrines. These assumptions are increasingly
embedded in the color blind anti-differentiation interpretation of equal protection. The economic
models ignore the social factors that make brown collar workers subservient as long as employers
treat all workers equally.
III. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF SEGREGATED WORKPLACES: THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVES
In the color blind model of anti-discrimination law, segregation is explained in
individualistic economic terms such as lack of interest, or lack of human capital. The assumptions of
courts and decision makers have shifted to conform to the narratives provided by the neoclassical
economic theories and the law and economics theorists who propound them.

The dominant

economic theories – neoclassical and dual labor market – form the underpinnings for color blind
anti-differentiation perspectives in anti-discrimination law.
A.

Neoclassical/Law and Economics Theory of Segregated Workplaces
The neoclassical economic theory and its law and economics counterparts employ

narratives for the existence of segregated workplaces that are rooted in the individual tastes and
preferences of employers and employees.111 The theory underestimates the employer’s role in
cultivating brown collar workplaces. Nonetheless, because it guides judicial review in employment
discrimination claims, an overview of the theory is important.112
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GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION, 14-17 (2d ed. 1971); see also, KENNETH
ARROW, THE THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION IN DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (Orley Ashenfelter and Albert
Rees, eds. 1973).
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See e.g., Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F.2d 302 (1988).
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In a truly unregulated market, according to the theory, the market drives out discriminatory
preferences because they are not related to productivity.113 Law and economics theorists, advancing
traditional economic models, argue that discrimination persists in the workplace because external
forces interfere with the market’s proper function.114 They contend that government regulation
should not interfere with the market process unless government action itself is causing
discriminatory behavior, or unless the market is so skewed that it affects worker choice.115
Antidiscrimination laws, therefore, harm or endanger the efficiency of the market. Segregation
persists because state policies interfere with market processes.116

Thus, for example, Jim Crow

legislation produced a segregated textile industry, when other industries at the time enjoyed an
overrepresentation of Blacks.117
While this argument may address employer rationales for failing to hire workers, it does not
adequately respond to the problem of “overrepresentations” in segregated occupations as possible
indicators of discriminatory practices. Instead, overrepresentation in a job is attributed to individual
human capital and employee preference.118 The theory is that a worker’s investment in his or her
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GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 111 at 14-16.
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See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 91-97 (1992).
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Id.
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Id. at 248.
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Epstein argues that government legislation and not "cognitive bias, endogenous preferences, or
calculation error" perpetuated segregated workplaces in the textile industry. Id. at 91-97.
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EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 114 at 152-153; R. M. Stolzenberg, Occupational
Differences Between Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, a report prepared for the National Commission for Economic
Policy, N-1889-NCEP (1982). Cf. Cass Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination 157-158, in FREE
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Oxford U. Press 1997). The Supreme Court adopted this rationale in Wards Cove,
when it found that minorities stay in low-paying jobs because they lack the social capital to seek better alternatives.
See generally, Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). This may account for some, although not all, of
the distribution. WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 7; Pew Occupational
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human capital will determine the worker’s place in the occupational distribution.119 The law and
economics version of this argument is demonstrated in Justice Posner’s explanation of wage
disparities in American Nurses’ Association v. State of Illinois:120
Economists have conducted studies which show that virtually the entire difference in the
average hourly wage of men and women, including that due to the fact that men and women
tend to be concentrated in different types of jobs, can be explained by the fact that most
women take time out of the labor force in order to take care of their children. As a result
they tend to invest less in their ‘human capital’ (earning capacity); since part of any wage is
a return on human capital, they tend therefore to be found in jobs that pay less.121
With respect to human capital arguments, the theory fails to account for why immigrant
workers, unskilled and with less education than most Blacks, have established themselves in niches
– such as construction or manufacturing – where they should not exist.122 Neoclassical economic
theory has been criticized for its inability to capture the social and political landscape surrounding
employer decisions. In other words, the theory fails to explain how or why employers choose
certain workers for a given set of jobs.
Critics also point out that discrimination can, in fact, be an economically rational decision
for employers.

Rational discrimination, therefore, may actually perpetuate segregation.

Stereotypes and generalizations, although broad and inaccurate, continue to exist throughout
market decision making because they are efficient. This type of categorization replaces more

Mobility Study, supra note 10, at 57.
119

EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 114, at 152-153.

120
783 F.2d 716 (1986). Judge Posner’s description is dicta in a case that allows female nurses to
prove pay discrimination.
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American Nurses’ Association v. State of Illinois, 783 F.2d at 719.
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WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 7.

34

individualized decision making about worker productivity. Such categorization, however, does
nothing to eradicate segregation. Cass Sunstein succinctly summarizes the problem,
Despite their imprecision, such categorical judgments might well be efficient as a costsaving device and thus persist in free markets; but they might also disserve the cause of
equality on the basis of race and gender . . . . The conclusion is that free markets will not
drive out discrimination to the extent that discrimination is an efficient use of
generalizations that, while inaccurate in some ways, have sufficient accuracy to persist as
classificatory devices.123
B. Dual Labor Market Theories of Segregated Workplaces
Dual labor market theory explains persistent inequalities despite increases in human
capital.124

According to the theory, the current segmented labor market results from market

restructuring over the past thirty years.

The labor market consists of primary and secondary

markets. The primary market controls core, stable jobs. The less desirable, unstable jobs occupy
the secondary market.125

Dual labor market theories define distinctions between core and

secondary jobs in terms of pay, occupational distribution, and conditions.126
According to dual labor market theory, jobs are stratified according to skill requirements.
The skill levels define higher and lower paying jobs within a market. In the restructured labor
market of the past several decades, employers up-skilledseveral jobs and de-skilled others. This
process has created even more specialized and routinized skilled and unskilled positions.
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Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2416 (2004).
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Lesley Williams Reid and Beth A. Rubin, Integrating Economic Dualism and Labor Market
Segmentation, 44 SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 405, 411 (2003).
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See e.g., PETER DOERINGER AND MICHAEL PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER
ANALYSIS (Toronto, 1971); Lesley Williams Reid and Beth A. Rubin, Integrating Economic Dualism, supra note
124, at 408; Nestor Rodriguez, “Workers Wanted”: Employer Recruitment of Immigrant Labor, 31 WORK AND
OCCUPATIONS, 453, 463 (2004).
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Lesley Williams Reid and Beth A. Rubin, Integrating Economic Dualism, supra note 124, at 408.
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Consequently, even within a company, the lines of progression are stratified. This polarized labor
market concentrates highly and poorly paid jobs in the same geographic market, or even in the same
location.127
Theorists have advanced several different reasons for market polarization. Doeringer and
Piore’s seminal work describes the phenomenon as the result of technological shifts creating firmspecific skills that keep primary market employees in their jobs over time.128 This aspect makes the
primary jobs more stable. The primary market may also reflect efforts to advance the interests of
the those who hold primary jobs, at the exclusion of others.129 This phenomenon makes the
secondary jobs even more unstable, and the primary jobs more difficult to obtain.
The employer’s role in creating the character and contours of the labor market is especially
influential in the secondary sector. In other words, “[i]n the models of economic segmentation, the
employer emerges as an especially critical starting and end point for the mustering of workforces in
the secondary labor market. In contrast to employers in the primary labor market who often must
follow established company policies, employers in the secondary labor market have greater room to
maneuver in organizing a workforce.”130 Thus, while the primary labor market reflects a seller’s
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Rodriguez, “Workers Wanted”, supra note 125, at 462; Pew Occupational Mobility Study, supra
note 10, at 8; HARRISON AND BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING
OF AMERICA (New York: Basic Books 1988).
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DOERINGER AND PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS, supra note 118,
at 29-34; KEITH GRINT, THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK, supra note 42, at 246.
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GRINT, THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK, supra note 42, at 246.

130

Rodriguez, “Workers Wanted”, supra note 125, at 463.
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market, the secondary labor market is a buyer’s market. The employer has much more leeway to
form a “picture in his head” about what type of person can best fill the secondary market job.131
In the secondary market, employers recruit and hire brown collar workers through channels
outside the ones that native-born workers use. Employers use several recruitment tools. Employers
directly recruit outside the country for these jobs.132

They participate in network hiring.133 They

utilize labor recruiters, so as to shield themselves from questions about immigration status.134 They
seek workers through day-labor pools.135 The numbers of Latinos concentrated in these occupations
as a result of such employer recruitment efforts leaves no doubt as to the segregated character of
brown collar occupations.136
The unstable character of the secondary labor market forces employers to continually and
actively seek workers in order to avoid labor shortages.137 The introduction of immigrant workers
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William T. Bielby, Social Science Accounts of the Maternal Wall: Application in Litigation
Contexts, 26 T. JEFFERSON L.REV. 15, 21 (2003); WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra
note 2, at 106-107.
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occupations. Pew Mexican Migrants Survey, supra note 12, at 13. Newly arrived immigrants especially tend to be
more experienced in construction and manufacturing in their home country than their earlier-arrived counterparts. A
recent study revealed that 62% of recently arrived construction workers found similar work in the U.S., while 45%
of hospitality workers found similar work in the U.S. Id. at 14.
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134
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Tyson Foods, Inc., (E.D. Tenn. ) (No. 4:01-CR-061 (Dec. 11, 2001), available at
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Although secondary market employers actively recruit workers from different sources, foreign
workers in the secondary market must secure their own visas or employment authorization documents. Work visas
for employees in the secondary market are extremely restricted or non-existent. The employer’s sole responsibility
under the current law is to ensure that documents are facially valid. For the most part, if workers have possibilities
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into this dual labor scheme helps explain why the neoclassical model of labor supply and demand
does not work, especially in the secondary sector.138 The neoclassical model assumes a potential
labor scarcity, while, in reality, alternative sources of labor exist, as is evident today with the
existence of brown collar workplaces.139 Evidence of an employer pull demonstrates that employers
are searching outside of their surrounding communities for labor pools.140 As a result, the wages of
existing workers in the market need not be driven up.
The dual labor market theory helps explain why brown collar workers occupy jobs with
short career ladders and in polarized, segmented markets.

It also helps explain wage disparities

over time. Most importantly, it provides a framework for understanding the powerful role of
employers’ recruitment, hiring and assignment practices, especially in the secondary market. It does
not, however, explain how and why employers’ targeting of subservience leads to brown collar
workplaces. Both economic theories would explain the existence of brown collar workplaces as
natural, inevitable processes. Examples from case law illustrate this point.
C. Case Law Illustrations of the Neoclassical and Dual Labor Market Economic Theories

274B(a)(6).
138

The secondary market remains vibrant in large part because the federal government does little to
enforce employer sanctions laws punishing employers for hiring undocumented workers. Congress passed these
provisions in 1986 to protect all workers, regardless of immigration status, from substandard conditions. H.R. Rep.
No. 99-682(I), at 47. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5662. Lax enforcement of the provisions perpetuates
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Evidence shows that in the agricultural and construction sectors, the migration pattern for Latinos
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Courts that accept the color blind, conventional economic theories would be skeptical of the
allegation that an employer’s biases and structuring of “unwanted” jobs ultimately creates the
segregated brown collar workplace. The presumption is that the employer, by treating similarly
situated employees equally, has not discriminated, even though the plaintiffs may find themselves in
subordinated or disadvantaged positions. Three cases demonstrate the power of the mainstream
economic theories in the case law.
1.

Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio141

Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio is the classic example of segregation that the disparate
treatment and disparate impact frameworks no longer adequately address. In Wards Cove, a group
of minority workers sued under Title VII’s disparate treatment and disparate impact theory, alleging
the employer’s hiring and promotion practices subjected minority workers to the cannery positions
and denied them opportunities as noncannery workers on the basis of race.142 The plaintiffs
produced statistics showing the overrepresentation of minority workers in the unskilled cannery
positions, and their underrepresentation in the more desirable, better-paying skilled noncannery
positions, filled predominantly by Anglos. The plaintiffs identified several employment practices –
including subjective hiring criteria, English language requirements, separate hiring channels, and a
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Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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See Brief of Amicus Curiae of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), 1988 WL 1026079 (1988). The NAACP’s brief does an excellent job of describing the difficulties
inherent in trying to squeeze a segregation fact pattern into one of the existing proof models: “the courts below did
not recognize the job segregation of minorities as a violation of Title VII. The District Court discounted evidence of
segregation of minorities in low paying jobs as”over-representation” of minorities. It then analyzed several
employment practices separately but never examined the interaction between segregated hiring, job assignment, and
the refusal to consider minorities for promotion or transfer. The Court of Appeals analyzed employment procedures
under the disparate impact principle and reversed the District Court. In applying the impact principle, it recognized
a “business necessity” defense to the maintenance of job segregation. This is not the law. Job segregation is illegal.
. . . The facts – segregation in hiring, job assignments, and refusal to transfer or promote minorities – make this case
an inappropriate vehicle to resolve questions concerning disparate impact theory.” Amicus Brief at 3-4
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practice of not promoting from within – that were responsible for the racial stratification of the
workforce.143 The employer argued that the nonwhite workers were overrepresented in the lessdesirable cannery jobs because the employer filled the jobs pursuant to a hiring hall agreement with
a predominantly nonwhite union.
The court of appeals held that the statistics showing the imbalance proved a prima facie case
of discrimination. The Supreme Court reviewed the disparate impact claims and reversed, holding
that simply showing an imbalance in the workforce proved nothing. Instead, the proper comparison
in a disparate impact analysis was between the racial composition of the qualified persons in the
labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs.144 The holding effectively eliminated disparate
impact claims involving classification or segregation of employees.145 The Court refused to read
employer bias into the imbalance in its workforce, noting that such a conclusion would leave any
employer with an imbalance not of his own making vulnerable to a lawsuit.146 The Court noted that
bottom line statistics of racial imbalance in the workforce were insufficient to prove causation.

147

The Court required a showing that each of the specific employment practices actually caused a

143

Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48.
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Id. at 650-51.
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However, the opinion leaves open the possibility of a claim if the dearth of qualified nonwhite
applicants were due to the employer’s practices that deterred protected class members from applying for jobs.
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Ward Cove, 490 U.S. at 652. As the Court noted, “racial imbalance in one segment of an
employer’s work force does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to the
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statistically significant imbalance.148 Its decision created a tremendous burden for plaintiffs seeking
to eradicate segregated workplaces through the available proof models. As Justice Blackmun noted
in his dissent:
This industry long has been characterized by a taste for discrimination of the old-fashioned
sort: a preference for hiring nonwhites to fill its lowest level positions, on the condition that
they stay there. The majority’s legal ruling essentially immunized these practices from
attack under a Title VII disparate-impact analysis.149
Justice Stevens’ dissent criticized the majority for “underestimating the probative value of
evidence of a racially stratified work force.”150 He noted that “such evidence of racial stratification
puts the specific employment practices challenged by [the minority workers] into perspective.”151
In fact, the “overrepresentation” in this case is a euphemism for segregation.152
In effect, the Wards Cove opinion required a showing of both segregation and proof of
discrimination through one of the existing models, even though, on its face, Title VII makes
segregation illegal.

As the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

(“NAACP”) stated in its amicus brief to the Court:
The statute is intended to assist those who have been segregated to break out of their
situations, not to permit the fact of segregation to justify restrictions against them. The
segregation into low paying jobs does not constitute favored treatment as the term “over-
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This particularly onerous burden was removed by Congress when it reversed parts of the Wards
Cove opinion in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662.
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Id. at 663.
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The dissent also notes that the overrepresentation of nonwhites in a particular position is
significant as a potential sign of barriers to opportunity in another part of the company’s workforce. Id. at 677.
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NAACP brief , supra note 142, at 9. (“Treating segregation as ‘over-representation’ obscured
segregation as a violation. The argument that because plaintiffs are segregated they are entitled to no relief because
they are over-represented is disingenuous.”).
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representation” suggests; rather, it constitutes the continued exploitation of minority workers
trapped into low-paying jobs.153
By the time the Court decided Wards Cove, it and other courts had distanced themselves
from the background assumption that employer practices reflected the perpetuation of historical
discrimination or were even discriminatory in and of themselves.154

In the Court’s narrative, the

employer was an innocent party operating in a color-blind world.155 This narrative of the colorblind employer exemplified in Wards Cove raises the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs, who must
present evidence to rebut the court’s assumption of colorblindness, even through the framework
may not require it.
The Supreme Court refused to accept the argument that the Wards Cove facts demonstrated
a form of illegal segregation akin to that in Brown v. Board of Education.156 The NAACP brief
described the similarities between the segregation of Blacks before the passage of Title VII and the
segregation in Wards Cove:
Because of the litigation under Title VII, many of the overt forms of discrimination, such as
hiring from dual segregated labor markets, discrimination in job assignments, and
discriminatory refusals to allow Blacks into better paying jobs, have been abandoned.
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NAACP brief, supra note 142, at 10.
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Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice, supra note 51, at 11491161. Schultz and Petterson provide an excellent empirical analysis of the courts’ willingness to accept the lack of
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arguments that plaintiffs were not interested in at-issue jobs, and accept plaintiffs’ evidence of past discrimination as
the explanation for segregated work conditions.
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However, there still remain circumstances in which minorities are restricted today, in
precisely the same manner as in earlier years.157
As the NAACP brief succinctly asserted, “Job segregation is illegal.”158 The NAACP urged
the Court to analyze the case as one involving segregation with it own framework for analysis
outside of the disparate impact framework.159 As the brief noted:
This obvious violation of Title VII was obscured because of the efforts of the courts below
to fit this case of brutal segregation into the framework of disparate impact or disparate
treatment. The concept of disparate impact was intended to address facially neutral
practices. The concept of disparate treatment was intended to order the proofs in an
individual case of discrimination. [The frameworks] were not developed in, nor have they
been applied to, cases of current work force segregation.160
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 fixed many of the problems that the NAACP brief cited as
obstacles to showing segregation as a Title VII violation. Most notably, it allows the plaintiffs to
target an employer’s decision making process as a whole, if the plaintiffs can show that “the
elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis.”161
This provision allows the plaintiff

to challenge employer decisions that are not easily
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identifiable.162 It presumably ensures that an employer remains liable for multi-factor decision
making.163
The statute’s amendments did not, however, provide a separate framework for analyzing
segregation cases. Consequently, conditions of segregation, such as those in the brown collar
workplace, are still subject to the proof structures of the disparate treatment or disparate impact
frameworks, absent direct evidence of discrimination.
2.

EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works164

In early word-of-mouth cases, especially those challenging practices that maintained White
jobs, courts condemned word-of-mouth hiring as discriminatory.165 Since then, a line of cases
condoning word-of-mouth hiring is rooted in the Wards Cove narrative. Those cases involve
immigrant hiring practices, which courts are reluctant to disturb. In EEOC v. Chicago Miniature
Lamp Works, the court allowed the practice when it involved ethnic niches within immigrant
communities in Chicago. The EEOC sued on behalf of a class of black applicants, challenging the
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company’s word-of-mouth hiring practices that resulted in the disproportionate hiring of other
minorities into entry level positions. The trial court found the company liable under both disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories. The circuit court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs failed
to show either an active employer practice that caused the disparate impact or that the employer
intentionally discriminated. Instead, the court held that the employer passively relied on word-ofmouth hiring to fill its low-wage jobs. In downplaying the EEOC’s statistics, the court considered
other causal factors affecting the relevant labor market, including commuting distance and English
fluency requirements.

The court credited the employer’s lack of interest defense, and the

neoclassical economic theory of supply and demand underlying the defense. The defense asserts
that workers – in this case, the African Americans who were not hired – choose the jobs that interest
them, and eschew others, for a variety of reasons.166

Ethnic immigrant workers chose these

particular jobs, and maintained a lock on their hiring over time. This competition among workers,
according to the argument, cannot be attributed to any employer practice.
The court’s reliance on the dominant neoclassical economic theory to explain the employer’s
behavior as passive167 ignores the sociological evidence to the contrary.168 Network recruiting is a
process that reflects employer preferences and employer attitudes about employee traits. The
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process starts with what the employer seeks from workers for a particular job, and transforms into
employers actively soliciting workers from a particular pool.169
3.

EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems170

The Seventh Circuit Court’s reasoning in EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems reflects the
assumption that the employer operates in a color blind manner. In that case, the EEOC sued a
Korean-owned janitorial and cleaning services company on behalf of a group of blacks, alleging that
the company discriminated in favor of Korean workers. The EEOC targeted the company’s wordof-mouth hiring practices as intentionally discriminatory.

The court found that although the

percentage of Koreans was disproportionate to their percentage in the labor market, that evidence
did not create an inference of discrimination.

The court assumed the inevitability, and therefore

non-discriminatory nature, of word-of-mouth hiring:
Of course, if the employer is a member of an ethnic community, especially an immigrant
one, this stance is likely to result in the perpetuation of an ethnically imbalanced work force.
Members of these communities tend to work and to socialize with each other rather than
with people in the larger community. The social and business network of an immigrant
community racially and culturally distinct from the majority of Americans is bound to be
largely confined to that community, making it inevitable that when the network is used for
job recruitment the recruits will be drawn disproportionately from the community.171
The court’s opinion in EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems echoed the prevalent narrative of the
struggling immigrant small business owner, while ignoring the need for anti-discrimination law to
protect the immigrant worker at the center of the employer’s preference:
The United States has many recent immigrants, and today as historically they tend to cluster
in their own communities, united by ties of language, culture, and background. Often they
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form small businesses composed largely of relatives, friends, and other members of their
community, and they obtain new employees by word-of-mouth. These small businesses –
grocery stores, furniture stores, clothing stores, cleaning services, restaurants, gas stations –
have been for many immigrant groups, and continue to be, the first rung on the ladder of
American success. Derided as clannish, resented for their ambition, and hard work, hated or
despised for their otherness, recent immigrants are frequent targets of discrimination, some
of it violent. It would be a bitter irony if the federal agency dedicated to enforcing the
antidiscrimination laws succeeded in using those laws to kick these people off the ladder by
compelling them to institute costly systems of hiring.172
The court utilized the myth of the immigrant worker climbing the economic ladder to condone the
network hiring mechanism. It further noted that bringing a claim under the disparate impact theory
would not have changed the outcome. The court would have decided, as it did in Miniature Lamp,
that there was no employment practice.173 The court pointed out that “it is not discrimination, and it
is certainly not active discrimination, for an employer to sit back and wait for people willing to
work for low wages to apply to him.”174
4.

Effect of the Economic Theory in Case Law

The powerful myth of the unwanted job infiltrates all levels – employers, workers, policy
makers, courts, and the public. It obscures employer intentionality, giving the illusion that taking
unwanted jobs is a natural part of the economic incorporation process for brown collar workers.
The mainstream economic theories support the myth and its corollary that by investing in one’s own
human capital, one can advance from these jobs. This dominant view is then reflected in the
implementation of the disparate impact and disparate treatment frameworks.
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The next section of this article provides the support for an alternative narrative thatportrays
the hiring of brown collar workers for the unwanted job as a much more deliberate and intentional
process. The alternative theories discussed here may provide the key to dismantling the myth of the
immigrant worker’s willingness to take the job no one else wants. If so, they may provide a claim
for the brown collar worker seeking to improve their workplace conditions.
IV. Sociological Theories of Segregated Workplaces: The Alternative Narratives
The mainstream economic theories simply do not fully explain how employer perceptions of
the potential labor pool affect the creation of a company’s workforce.

Three interrelated

sociological theories provide the alternative to the mainstream economic narratives.
A. Economic Sociology Theories of Segregated Workplaces
Economic sociology theories posit that labor markets do not develop in isolation. Labor
markets develop in the context of personal relationships, and social structures that inform economic
decisions.175 Economic sociologists critique neoclassical and dual labor market theories for their
inability to recognize that social conditions continually influence economic decisionmaking.176
Neoclassical theories ignore social, religious, and political institutions; dual labor market theories
assume that actors always act according to their class and social status.177

In the economic

sociology literature, economic actors are not simply isolated, pre-determined, rational, lowest-cost
benefit seekers. Nor are they playing a pre-determined role based on their class or social status.
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Instead, economic transactions are embedded in interpersonal relationships that influence decisions
such as labor market prices and workplace conditions.178
Economic sociology theory explains the prevalence of network hiring for jobs that become
segregated over time. Employers take advantage of the networks that newly arrived immigrants
have built around them.179 In the words of economic sociologists, “economic institutions are
constructed by the mobilization of resources through social networks, conducted against a
background of constraints given by previous historical development of society, polity, market, and
technology.”180
Network hiring, therefore, is a method for maintaining existing job structures. Networks
perpetuate the ethnic and racial composition of the workforce. Ultimately, the employer benefits
from network hiring both because it is less costly and because it ensures stability in the workplace
without much of an implicit promise from the employer other than the initial job.181 Economic
178
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sociology, through its network theory, explains how the social relations between employer and
employee, coupled with the social conditions of the employees, perpetuates segregated workplaces.
Once a group of pioneers successfully plays the subservient role that employers seek, employers
continue to seek them out, thus starting a niche hiring cycle that, in turn, develops segregated
workplaces.182
Certain jobs become the domain of a particular ethnic group, especially after a network
hiring pattern is established.183 The economic sociology model helps reveal that network hiring
requires active communication, cultivation of a particular group of workers, and maintenance of a
network of social relations over time. Network hiring is far from the passive process some courts
have portrayed.184
B. Socio-Psychological Theories: Employer Biases Influencing Segregated Workplaces
The socio-psychological literature on employer bias, addressed extensively in legal
scholarship, explains the dynamics that cause the employer to act on unconscious biases about the
brown collar worker as a subservient worker.185 Charles Lawrence’s groundbreaking article, The Id,
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The Ego, and Equal Protection,186 analyzes cognitive psychologists’ explanations of unconscious
racism stemming, in part, from a process of “categorization” in which people maximize and
minimize differences according to the categories in which they fall.187 The unconscious racism that
stems from the categorization process explains the employer’s willingness to preserve
differentiations between in-group and out-group members.188
The story does not end there, however. Social cognition theory demonstrates the effects of
categorization on humans’ perceptions even when out-group bias is not at issue.189 Bias can arise as
much out of in-group favoritism as out of aversion to an out-group.190 The in-group is favored for
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the more desired positions and the out-group fills the remaining positions.191 In-group status makes
in-group members undesirable for jobs on the lower rungs.192 Thus, inferior jobs become the
domain of the out-group, in this case, immigrants.
The cognitive bias conception of discrimination is not adequately captured by current antidiscrimination law.193

Professor Linda Krieger analyzes how categorization affects humans’

perceptions in ways that the frameworks do not recognize.194 She draws on behavioral studies that
show how stereotypes “influence how information is interpreted, the causes to which events are
attributed, and how events are encoded into, retained in, and retrieved from memory.”195 It is in this
subconscious process that bias can emerge. As Professor Oppenheimer suggests, the search for
motive in the intentional discrimination framework may be incomplete:
[I]f, as asserted herein, experimental psychology reveals that unconscious racism governs
behavior among white employers who would not consciously choose to discriminate against African
Americans, then their conduct cannot be explained by a search for malice or bigotry. If those whites
charged with making employment decisions have internalized negative stereotypes about African
Americans, as the experimental data suggest, the stereotypes will be reflected in their decisions,
even if they have no desire, motivation or intent to treat African Americans differently.196
Other legal scholars have reached similar conclusions.

Professor Ann McGinley, for

example, explores sociological and psychological experiments that reveal how racist attitudes are
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often rooted in unconscious behaviors.197 Unconscious stereotypes result in automatic, unconscious
behavior, a process which she argues must be considered within an effective anti-discrimination
framework.198
The socio-psychological theories, rooted as they are in employer behavior, explain some of
the motivations that make employers equate brown collar workers with the subservient workers they
seek. They help explain how employers internalize bias and how it can emerge through employer
decisions. These theories complement the economic sociology theories, as well as those theories
that focus on how employment organizational structures perpetuate segregated workplaces.199 They
allow us to understand the targeting of brown collar workers for their subservient qualities as a form
of discrimination.
C. Structuralist Theories
Structuralist critics of dual labor market theories challenge their inability to explain why
wage inequality and segregation persists even within establishments.200 Structuralist sociologists
have provided much evidence to support the argument that segregated workplaces are more than
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simply a byproduct of restructured labor markets.201 Barbara Reskin, for example, draws important
connections between social cognition theories and organizational theories to explain current
segmented labor structures.202

Reskin, who has conducted several women’s workplace studies,

attributes wage disparities and segregation to employer attitudes – usually unconsciously motivated
– about race and sex.203 According to those studies, although labor market structure may explain a
part of earnings (e.g., a manager at an auto parts store will make less than a manager at a brokerage
firm), race and gender play a large role in pay inequalities.204 Employers relegate non-whites to less
desirable jobs, in part because they harbor biases and stereotypes that infect employment decisions.
These decisions create labor queues in which white males are favored. As one set of researchers
concluded:
[D]espite changes in the structure of work over the past thirty years, we continue to observe
the costs of working in secondary labor markets within both economic sectors and the costs
of working in the peripheral sector regardless of labor market location. These findings belie
the claims of postindustrial theorists who argue that the new economy has eliminated the
barriers to mobility that characterized earlier decades . . . . Race, therefore, contributes to
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earning disparities, but its effect operates through the distribution of nonwhites to less
lucrative jobs across industries.205
The structuralist

focus on the organizational side of the employer-employee dynamic brings

together the various sociological theories into a coherent narrative regarding the preference for and
treatment of brown collar workers. Much of the structuralist research focuses on the differences in
employer treatment of men and women. To sum up the structuralist account, “differential treatment
is built into organizational policy and practice and taken for granted in assumptions about, in any
particular organization, what kinds of work is women’s work and what kind of work is men’s
work.”206 Its insights apply as well to the brown collar context.207
Legal scholars embracing structuralist theories have asserted that the current doctrine fails to
capture the discriminatory practices that create unfavorable structures. These practices are difficult
to pinpoint because they fall between disparate treatment and disparate impact frameworks.208 They
also remain difficult to pinpoint because of strong employer narratives regarding employee interest
in jobs.209
The structuralist theories explain the methods by which employer cognitive or unconscious
bias can turn into systems that perpetuate discrimination in the workplace. They help link the
economic sociology and socio-psychological theories into a broader theory that encompasses an
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employer’s economic decisions, the social context of those decisions, the employer’s cognitive
biases, and the ultimate structures that create and perpetuate the brown collar workplace.
Empirical and ethnographic data from studies of employers who have hired immigrant
workers illustrate the power of the sociological theories in explaining how segregation occurs and is
maintained in the brown collar workplace. These examples illustrate how the sociological theories
can play a role in understanding employer actions and how they contribute to maintaining a
segregated workforce.
D. Illustrations of the Alternative Theories in Case Studies
1.

The New York Civil Service Example: Historical Precedent

Immigration sociologist Roger Waldinger, who has studied ethnic niches for decades,
explains that immigrant niches arise from changes in employment structures, which, in turn, allow
for shifts in the type of employee hired.210 In a case study of immigrant professionals entering
engineering niches in New York City, Waldinger explored the historical and situational shifts in the
civil service system that allowed for initial immigrant penetration in some civil service jobs. 211 In
this historical example, the employer’s decision to require standardized exams for what had
previously been patronage jobs shifted the pool toward more educated Jewish immigrants.212 This
population had not previously enjoyed access to such jobs.213 This job structuring process opened a
door for one ethnic group by creating a distaste for it among others. By 1975, when New York City
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experienced a fiscal crisis that resulted in massive layoffs and job restructurings, immigrants had
begun to cluster in a narrow range of occupations.214 During the fiscal crisis, the city encouraged
older workers to take early retirement, and kept its more recent hires, many of them immigrants.215
After the city began to rehire employees, the immigrant niches expanded, in part, through informal,
word-of-mouth networks. By then, because the jobs were considered “immigrant” jobs, salaries had
been suppressed for years.
The city’s explanation for not being able to attract White workers was that only immigrants
wanted those jobs.216 This narrative, of course, ignores the city’s participation in structuring the
jobs in such a way as to attract particular minorities, in a dynamic that Waldinger calls “a matrix
shaped by difference in the behavior of native and immigrant workers, the role of recruitment
networks, and the internal labor market structure of the civil service itself.”217
2.

The American Workplace Today: How the Other Half Works – The
Waldinger/Lichter Survey of Immigrant Workers

The New York civil service story can be re-told today through the brown collar experience.
One important characteristic of the story parallels the brown collar experience. City managers
relied on the narrative of the unwanted job to explain how immigrant workers fit into their
occupations. The narrative of the “unwanted job” is advanced by employers and immigrants’ rights
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advocates alike today in response to arguments that immigrants are taking jobs away from nativeborn workers.218
1.

How the Other Half Works: The Waldinger/Lichter Survey of Immigrant
Workers

In a survey of Los Angeles low-wage employers conducted between 1993 and 1997,
sociologists Waldinger and Lichter interviewed employers to figure out how and why they
determined whether and where to use immigrant workers in their operations.219 The conclusions
from this survey illustrate how employers seeking subservient workers operate to create and
perpetuate segregated workplaces. The survey findings demonstrate the accuracy of structuralist
sociology, economic sociology, and socio-psychological theories to explain how employer
preferences for subservient workers lead to the development of segregated workplaces.
Over a period of three years, Waldinger and Lichter interviewed 228 employers in low-wage
industries in Los Angeles county.220

The sociologists sought to understand how employer

perceptions about workers and their social conditions determined a worker’s place within a
company.221
The survey found that “when asking which workers bosses prefer, understandings of groups’
suitability for subordination – as opposed to employers’ ethnic attitudes, independent of content”

218

See e.g., Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Who Left the Door Open?, supra note 5.

219

WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2.

220

The survey covered employers in the printing, furniture, manufacturing, hospital, department
stores, hotel and restaurant industries. Id. at 22-23.
221

WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra note 2, at 21. Initially they
sought to determine whether immigrants were taking jobs that native born workers wanted. During the project,
however, the sociologists found that the question was too narrow to define what they viewed as a broader issue of
employer expectations and perceptions, and the interaction between ethnicity and the organization of the modern
workplace.

58

was the crucial consideration in hiring and recruitment.222 Employers viewed themselves as looking
for workers suitable to fill a type of job, rather than looking for a particular type of person.223 In
other words, employers were not trying to keep workers out of jobs as much as they were trying to
figure out what workers best fit certain jobs. Cognitive bias, in turn, plays a role in how employers
determine who gets what job and the conditions of those jobs.
Subservience was key to the employer’s requirement for the jobs at the bottom of the wage
scale: “The greater the demand [in the workplace] for subordination, the more likely it is that fitness
for subordination, even subservience, will loom large in the employer’s eyes.”224 As Waldinger and
Lichter summarized:
Simply put, bosses want willing subordinates. After all, employers are looking for workers
who will do the jobs as told, with the minimum amount of ‘lip.’. . . they also prefer
‘cooperative’ to ‘combative,’ and deferential over rebellious – in other words, a worker who
knows her or his place.225
Employers prefer subservient workers precisely because they are less likely to cause workplace or
production disruptions or sow discontent among their colleagues.226

Employers also seek

subservient workers because they are less likely to grow unhappy with their jobs.
Waldinger and Lichter’s survey indicated that employers’ perceptions of who would make a
good subordinate were important to the employment process. Immigrant workers, in part because
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of their social and legal status, fill a role for those employers who seek subservient workers.227 In
other words, in the low-wage sector, employers perceive that because of their social situation,
immigrant workers are more compliant than, and therefore, preferable to native-born workers. This
characteristic makes immigrant workers more desirable, precisely because of their political
disenfranchisement.228
The degree to which society accepts a group of immigrants affects employer attitudes toward
that group. Historically, government and society have accepted immigrants differentially.229

Of

course, the extent to which government policies accept or reject immigrant groups over a period of
time affects their incorporation into society.230 The workplace will reflect hostile or ambivalent
policies toward immigrants.

Policy makers have treated Latino workers poorly throughout

history.231 Recent court decisions and Congressional mandates reflect such hostility.232

These

hostile measures only increase the vulnerability of brown collar workers. Today’s ongoing debates

227

Employers readily made the link between subservience and Latino immigrant status. As one
employer noted, “[t]he Latinos in our locations, most are recent arrivals. Most are tenuously here, and here on
fragile documents. I see them as subservient.” WALDINGER AND LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS, supra
note 2, at 163.
228

Similar observations were made of hiring queues in manufacturing jobs in the Silicon Valley:
“[T]he search for an acquiescent labor force encourages employers to find workers who are less likely to assert their
rights, either individually through filing a formal complaint to a regulatory agency or filing a lawsuit or collectively
through the labor unions. The perceived racial difference in each of the groups’ willingness to ‘rock the boat’ is a
recurrent theme in the explanation of the composition of assembly workers in Silicon Valley.” Edward J.W. Park,
Racial Ideology, supra note 3, at 230.
229

As sociologist Alejandro Portes describes, “immigrants from Britain and northwestern Europe
have typically experienced the least amount of resistance, while those of phenotypically or culturally distinct
backgrounds have endured much greater social prejudice.” ALEJANDRO PORTES, ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION, supra note 181, at 24.
230

Id.

231

MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 42, at 1-14.

232

Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002).

60

in Congress and in the public realm about undocumented immigration and guest worker programs
are perfect examples of the effect of governmental and societal attitudes on employer behavior.233
The current anti-immigrant sentiment emerging from policy makers and the public affects
workplace dynamics. In the language of economic sociology, the possibilities and limits placed on
brown collar workers in the workplace will reflect the constraints and possibilities which society
and government place on Latino immigrants.234 The Waldinger/Lichter study illustrates that
treatment.
An employer’s perception of an employee’s social status, station or class affects an
employer’s hiring practices.235 Waldinger and Lichter found that the closer applicants were to the
employer’s class or station, the less willing the employer was to hire them for menial jobs, because
of perceptions they would quickly be dissatisfied with the job.236 Where employers perceive a job
as demeaning, they reserve it for workers who are unrespected.237
As a corollary, employers perceive that native born workers may not be willing to do the
work that low-wage jobs require.238 Sociologist Karen Hossfeld, a white native-born woman, found
that employers tried to dissuade her from taking a job as an electronics assembler – primarily held
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by immigrant women – by telling her she would not want that work.239 Anthropologist Steve
Striffler found a similar reception when he tried to apply for a production job in a poultry plant in
Arkansas.240

These examples illustrate the effects of employer perception in the creation of

segregated workplaces in general. In the context of low-wage hiring, personal attitudes about a
given race or ethnicity often translate into hiring preferences for certain positions. Thus, the
perception that Latinos are complacent translates into a preference for Latinos for the least
desirable, dead-end jobs in a plant.241

The study’s findings support the conclusions of the socio-

psychological literature about the role of unconscious bias in employer decision making.
In the Waldinger/Lichter survey, employers explain their preferences for immigrant workers
in nuanced terms such as work ethic.242 Employers claimed that immigrant workers were superior
to native born workers because they maintained a stronger work ethic.243

Employers articulated

worker ethic, in turn, in terms of docility: “American workers are more concerned with their rights,
as opposed to immigrants who just want a job and will settle for minimal pay without fuss.
[Without immigrants] we’d have more problems managing workers that would be more difficult
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and more demanding.”244

Waldinger and Lichter interviewed numerous employers who articulated

immigrant workers’ willingness to perform the difficult work as positive characteristics for
selection. Employers couched their assessment in contextual terms, “praising the immigrants for
traits especially valuable in the function that the newcomers filled.”245

Foremost among these

traits, of course, was subservience. Employers consistently found immigrants suitable for the “hard,
menial poorly remunerated” work that was not suitable for native-born workers.246 Employers
especially praised immigrant workers who took menial jobs with short job ladders and few outlets
for upward mobility.247 Importantly, in those cases where the job ladder was more extended,
employers tended to view whites’ work ethic more favorably.248
The Waldinger/Lichter survey also revealed that employers blamed third party preferences
for the position of immigrant workers in their workplaces.249 In other words, employers claimed
they were respecting the desires of customers and co-workers when they kept workers segregated
from each other.

Moreover, employers expressed concern about customer preferences as well as

the preferences of more skilled workers in making hiring decisions at the low-wage level.250
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Employers rationalized segregating immigrant from native workers as a measure to keep the peace
among both customers and upper level workers, who might otherwise feel threatened when
opportunities were opened to foreign-born workers. This rationalization accounts for workplaces in
which brown collar workers fill “back of the house” jobs, but not “front of the house” jobs in stores,
restaurants and hotels.251
The Waldinger/Lichter study demonstrates the power of the alternative theories to break
down the myth of the unwanted job and the effects on brown collar workers of employers seeking
subservience. It explains several employer attitudes with a coherent narrative that goes beyond the
traditional economic explanations for segregated workplaces.

It explains the brown collar

workplace as the product of subordination based on several practices that neither the frameworks,
nor the economic theories underlying current jurisprudence, adequately recognize: cognitive bias,
structural dynamics in the workplace, and organizational impediments to advancement. These are
interrelated dynamics in the brown collar workplace. The strength of the alternative sociological
theories lies in their power to dismantle the traditional views of why segregated workplaces exist.
They help us understand how discrimination perpetuates itself in the brown collar context.
E. Illustrations of the Alternative Theories in Current Anti-Discrimination Law: The Subjective
Criteria Cases
Subjective criteria cases provide some good examples of the alternative theories at work in
the litigation context. They utilize the existing frameworks to move workers – mostly women – out
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of the employment tracks to which they have been relegated. They provide one potential model for
brown collar workers who seek to realize the advancement opportunities that the traditional
immigrant myth promises.252
In the subjective criteria cases, plaintiffs challenge employer’s subjective decision making
on the theory that it masks bias in the employer’s treatment of a protected class. Subjective
decision-making is “based on the exercise of personal judgment or the application of inherently
subjective criteria.”253 Although subjective criteria do not automatically give rise to an inference of
discrimination,254 courts have scrutinized them because of their potential as “ready mechanism[s]
for discrimination.”255 As such, they have been found to violate Title VII under both the disparate
impact and disparate treatment theories.
In subjective criteria channeling cases, plaintiffs identify subjective promotion and
assignment practices that channel plaintiffs into particular jobs and keep them out of more desirable
jobs, or track plaintiffs into positions with relatively short progression tracks.
Of course, the key to successful litigation in the brown collar context is to overcome the
overwhelmingly popular perception that immigrant workers want these jobs. The subjective criteria
cases have tackled parallel burdens in the gender and race context. Three case examples show how
this litigation has changed employment structures that relegated plaintiffs to dead-end jobs in the
gender context.
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1.

Butler v. Home Depot256

Subjective criteria channeling case have effectively attacked segregated workplaces by
requiring employers to provide real advancement tracks to their employees. In Butler v. Home
Depot, the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Home Depot discriminated against
women in all aspects of its personnel management, including the hiring and segregating of women
in initial job placement, promotion and compensation.257 Underlying these practices were employer
stereotypes about the type of work women could or wanted to perform in the stores. Women were
relegated to dead-end cashier positions, while men were initially assigned to floor positions, which
led to management positions. The court certified the class, allowing the plaintiffs to show just how
the company’s subjective hiring criteria relegated them to the dead-end jobs.
2.

The Grocery Store Cases

Women have launched class action suits against several grocery store chains for practices
that channel and segregate women into dead end jobs.258 The typical pattern in these cases involved
women being hired into bakery and deli positions, and men being hired into produce and grocery
positions. The plaintiffs in these cases alleged that their segregation was due to subjective decision
making in hiring and recruiting.

Managers, who were not provided guidance regarding

assignments, steered women into gender-stereotyped positions. Management maintained a “tap on
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the shoulder” system for recruiting workers into management and training opportunities. The
employers’ responses included women’s lack of drive, their desire for flexibility, their career
choices, and customer preferences for male managers as reasons for the segregation. These are all
arguments traditionally found in neoclassical economic explanations for segregated workplaces.
Many of these cases settled before trial. In the one published case, Stender v. Lucky
Stores,259 the court found the company liable for discrimination for its subjective practices. The
court held that the plaintiffs proved sex discrimination was the company’s standard operating
procedure. The plaintiffs showed that the employer’s subjective assignment and promotion policies
left open the possibility for bias.260

The plaintiffs prevailed on their disparate treatment and

disparate impact claims.261
3.

Dukes v. Wal-Mart262

The recent Wal-Mart case is a classic example of the channeling case utilizing social science
evidence to show that employer cognitive bias hinders women’s advancement. A class of female
plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart’s subjective promotion decisions have resulted in a workforce that
is 65% female hourly workers, and only 33% female salaried managers.263 Wal-Mart has claimed
that women are disproportionately not interested or available for management positions because
they do not have the time for the long, demanding, inflexible hours that management jobs require.264
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The plaintiffs’ social science evidence rebuts the allegation. The plaintiffs’ social scientists have
drawn on the socio-psychological research regarding cognitive bias to point out features of WalMart’s management promotion system that allow stereotypes to influence decision makers’ idea of
the perfect candidate for the management jobs.265 The district court has certified the case a class
action lawsuit.266
4.

The Mixed Success of Subjective Criteria Cases

These cases demonstrate the increasing difficulty with characterizing segregation cases as
subjective criteria cases. Although plaintiffs have successfully mounted numerous challenges to an
employer’s subjective decisionmaking practices,267 there remain almost as many unsuccessful
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challenges.268 The unsuccessful cases illustrate the limitations of the doctrines as courts move away
from the presumption that subjective criteria mask bias or discrimination in the workplace.269 Courts
continue to resist the idea that employers can have general policies of subjective decision making.
Many of the cases fail on the causation element, indicating that courts continue to credit employer’s
narratives for employees’ failure to advance.270 As a result, the outcome of the case continues to
depend on the background assumptions of the court deciding a case. The successful cases target more
overt examples of discrimination that are based on old-school stereotypes about women’s roles in the
workplace.271 The alternative sociological theories should begin to challenge the stereotypes in the
brown collar context in the same way. As yet, the overt bias in, and consequent structures that result
from, employers seeking subservient workers is not as apparent as they have been in the successful
subjective criteria cases.
V. WORKING TOWARD A REMEDY FOR BROWN COLLAR WORKERS

for analysis.”).
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A. Incorporating an Anti-Subordination Principle and the Sociological Theories into AntiDiscrimination Frameworks
Several commentators have advocated for the re-incorporation of the anti-subordination or
“anticaste”272 principle into anti-discrimination law.273

Incorporating the alternative sociological

theories into the existing frameworks is a step in that direction.
The anti-subordination principle holds that the law should eliminate any mechanisms that
subjugate or subordinate a particular protected class. The principle works on the assumption that the
law should do everything it can to remove the conditions that contribute to the establishment of an
underclass in this society.274 This principle has actually existed since early in our jurisprudence.275
The anti-subordination principle acknowledges the different ways in which structures interact to keep
protected classes subjugated.276

In the brown collar context, legal systems, societal conditions,

political disenfranchisement, and the “newness” of the workforce all interact to create the
subservience that employers actively seek for their workplaces. Employers take advantage of these
272
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societal forces to create the elements for segregated workplaces. Under the current frameworks, this
type of subordination, sometimes termed ‘societal discrimination’ is not actionable.277
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power,278 which created the disparate impact
model of proof for anti-discrimination cases, includes elements of the anti-subordination principle. In
that case, the Court prohibited hiring practices that have a disproportionate impact on minorities
unless the employer can justify the practice with a business necessity. The Court’s rule applies even
to facially neutral policies or practices that have an adverse impact on a protected class. This
interpretation of the statute incorporates the anti-subordination principle.279 Because a facially neutral
practice has a disproportionate impact on a protected class, it has the power to subordinate that class.
It is acceptable upon a showing of business necessity only if less discriminatory alternatives are
unavailable.
The subjective criteria channeling cases discussed earlier can also be re-interpreted as antisubordination segregation cases. These cases were litigated in the context of the wage gap effects of
continued gender segregation, especially in the retail market. They confront the myths of “choice”
that the color blind principle in the law perpetuates. By framing the cases as ones in which women
have been relegated to dead-end jobs, they invoke the spirit of the anti-subordination principle. They
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have served to target the most obvious forms of categorization, even as they point to specific
subjective practices that have adverse effects, as the frameworks require. They confront the belief
that gender segregation is the result of women’s choice. Instead, they seek to break down the
structures that keep women in second-class jobs. The successful cases have identified and challenged
the myths that keep women subordinated. The same must be accomplished for brown collar workers.
If the anti-subordination principle were at the center of anti-discrimination theory, the
sociological theories presented here would play an important role in revealing discriminatory
employer practices. The research presented here is especially suited to an anti-subordination theory
that aims to weed out the type of targeting for vulnerable populations that is at the root of brown
collar workplaces.
The anti-subordination principle is a simple, yet, admittedly, politically elusive “fix” that will
allow brown collar workers to eliminate segregated working conditions. It is a politically elusive
“fix” precisely because of the strength of mainstream economic assumptions about how our labor
markets operate.
Ultimately, re-incorporating the anti-subordination principle could benefit both the workers
relegated to the least desirable positions and those excluded from them. If the purpose of the Title VII
frameworks were truly to eliminate segregated workplaces on the theory that they perpetuate
subordination in the workplace, brown collar workers would be able to use Title VII to improve the
terms and conditions of jobs. Once improved, these jobs would be desirable to native-born workers,
who have been effectively shut out of the jobs.
CONCLUSION
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Brown collar workers cannot suffer without a remedy in anti-discrimination law. Although
formally, they may be able to make a case – as women have in successful subjective criteria cases –
the barriers remain high without a shift in popular thinking about how, or even whether, employers
choose their workforces.
Employer preferences for subservient workers cause them to target brown collar workers and
create for them a set of “unwanted” jobs. Employers essentially choose the ethnic composition of
jobs by setting the pay and conditions of those jobs. The result is a group of segregated jobs and
occupations, with their attendant harms, including wage disparities, occupational disparities, wage
suppression over time, and a general worsening of work conditions over time. Brown collar workers
hired into those jobs have little recourse in anti-discrimination law to improve their conditions.
The cases involving segregated workers illustrate the power of neoclassical economic theories
in decision makers’ assumptions about how employers treat immigrant jobs.

The Title VII

frameworks have incorporated the mainstream economic assumptions, making it difficult to attack the
existence of brown collar workplaces.
The three alternative sociological theories support the premise that employers, in fact, target
subservient workers for certain jobs.

Their biases help identify brown collar workers as the

subservient workers of choice. Employers play a larger role than the neoclassical economic theories
suggest in creating the labor pool and structuring jobs in the low wage sector. The alternative theories
allow us to pierce through the myth that the resultant segregated workplaces are inevitable and natural
consequences of labor market dynamics. A shift toward the anti-subordination principle in Title VII
jurisprudence, reflected in the sociological theories, is necessary.
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The problem of the brown collar worker ultimately reflects the problem of all workers in the
American economy, especially those at the lower rungs of the economic ladder. The assumptions of
about the subservience of brown collar workers that makes them desirable have a mirror image in
assumptions about native born workers that make them undesirable.

In these mirror image

assumptions lie the seeds for bringing together all workers to challenge through anti-discrimination
law the ways that employers set wage rates and conditions. The first step is to recognize the
connections between employers targeting brown collar workers for their subservience and the
resultant segregated workplaces. This article has provided some of the theories that make those
connections more visible.

The deterioration of job conditions over time, and the creation of

“immigrant” jobs is not a natural occurrence. The anti-discrimination frameworks should more
readily facilitate challenges to the practices that create these conditions.
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